Invasion by a Tit-for-Tat Minority

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Effect of the Territorial Structure

We saw in the last slide how the four Tit-for-Tat agents were more likely to interact amongst each other when the territorial structure constraints were strengthened. This, in turn, ensures higher total payoffs for these agents, and should aid a strategy invasion by the Tit-for-Tat minority.

Once again, to confirm this intuition, we varied α, and ran 300 societies like the one in the last slide for each value of the parameter. Below we present the ratio of successfully completed Tit-for-Tat invasions to those that were successfully put down by the majority strategy. Note that in this case higher territorial structure helps the invasion out, while it served as a deterrent of an invasion by an All-D minority.


Figure 2. Ratio of completed Tit-for-Tat invasions to repelled Tit-for-Tat invasions. δ = 0.6

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